THE TALLINN BOMBING
From the start it was clear that the bombing was not a strategic strike but a carpet bombing with the objective of destroying entire sections of the city including the downtown core. A total of 3,068 bombs were dropped, including 1,300 incendiary bombs. The Tallinn bombing killed, by most estimates, nearly 800 people and left 659 wounded, or 1-1.5% of the population, mostly civilians and left 20,000 homeless. The physical destruction to Tallinn itself was massive. A total of 5,073 structures were hit. Tallinn was in flames, but if the Red Army’s intent was to break the spirit of the Estonians, the opposite result was achieved. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians produced only a new loathing of the invaders.
On March 8 the planned assault began but after a series of battles, with the heavier casualties on the attacker’s side, by the end of the month the Red Army remained stalled on the Narva front with serious losses to their units. Taking advantage of the situation, the German army quickly planned a counter assault with the aim of breaking the bridgehead near Auvere. The assault began on April 6 and was renewed April 19. Although unable to destroy the bridgehead, the enemy was nevertheless forced into a defensive position. In Krivasoo, however, the Red Army continued its attack but failed to make any substantial headway.
As winter came to a close, both sides, suffering from heavy casualties, needed time to regroup and a period of relative calm ensued. Subsequent events would show that this was only the calm before the storm. Of the Estonian men who fought at Narva Mamers writes:
By the summer of 1944 the situation on the front lines of the war in Europe had fundamentally changed. On June 6th, D-Day, the Allies invaded Normandy and two weeks later the Red Army began its massive summer offensive on the eastern front. Allied air forces had targeted Germany’s synthetic oil plants which put the existence of the entire Luftwaffe in peril, German fighter and tank production was greater than ever but could not keep up with losses, trained replacements could hardly be found. It appeared that the destruction of Germany was now only a question of time.
During the spring the Red Army had quietly begun moving additional units to Narva. The Germans, however, had no reserve units to draw upon. Further, because of the calm on the Narva front since April, a number of units and armour had been moved elsewhere. It became obvious that the forces remaining were too few in number to successfully defend the line. German command once again began considering abandoning Estonia altogether and moving their forces to the front in Ukraine. The question was discussed with Hitler on June 20, 1944 in the infamous Wolf’s Lair at Rastenburg. General Adolf Heusinger, Chief of Operations, had been giving a gloomy overview of the situation on the northern and central fronts and was concluding his report: “The Russian is driving with strong forces west of the Duna toward the north. His spearheads are already southwest of Dunaburg. If our army group around Lake Peipus is not immediately withdrawn, a catastrophe...”. General Heusinger could not finish the sentence. At that moment a bomb exploded beneath the conference table. In the end, Hitler did not withdraw the troops from Estonia. His only supply of nickel was from Finland and Sweden was a supplier of precious iron ore and consequently it was imperative that he maintain control of the Baltic Sea. As well, it was in Germany’s interests to have Finland keep the Russians occupied in their continuing war.
By the middle of July German command had no choice but to pull their line back some ways from Narva to a series of readily defensible hills, the ‘Sinimäed’, comprised of a long stretch of high ground known as the “Swedish Wall” and two vital hills, “Grenadier” hill and “Orphanage” hill. It had become evident already in early July that a major assault was being planned by the Red Army - an assault of massive force: 75,000 men north of Narva, 130,000 men at the Auvere bridgehead, their heavy artillery outnumbering the defenders by 8:1, 546 planes to the Germans’ 49 and three times as many tanks as the Germans had to offer. It is worth noting that due to the United States ‘lend lease’ policy the Soviets were by this time ‘armed to the teeth’ with modern weaponry. The assault began on July 24 and by July 26 the Red Army occupied Narva. The next day they were at the front line, the ‘Tannenburg’ line, of the German army at the Sinimäed. Despite the Red Army’s superiority in numbers of troops and amount of armament, the Estonian and German units managed to hold the Tannenburg line. On August 10, Red Army command ordered a halt to the attack. Although the defenders had suffered heavy casualties, the losses on the Red Army side were enormous, by some estimates upwards of 150,000 men dead.
TARTU
In southern Estonia, the Red Army had relatively more success than in the north. An attack begun in July broke through the Germans’ “Panther” line and the border towns of Ostrov and Pihkva were taken. By the end of the month they were at the “Marienburg” line, which stretched roughly from Pihkva Lake down to Gulbene in Latvia, where they stopped to regroup and prepare for what Moscow viewed as the final ‘liberation’ of Soviet territory, meaning the Baltic states. At the same time, the Red Army had broken through in southern Latvia, nearly reaching Riga.
On August 10 an assault was begun on the Marienburg line and in short order the line was broken and the Red Army was in southern Estonia. The situation had all the earmarks of turning into a catastrophe for the Germans and on August 12 army group “Nord” commander General Schörner asked permission directly from the Führer to abandon northern Estonia but the answer was no. He was to fortify his positions and stop the enemy’s advance although he was given no additional forces with which to accomplish this. Unable to defend the entire line, the Germans opted to defend only certain strategic positions which, of course, enabled Soviet forces to sneak past the German strongholds and surprise the Germans in the rear. By August 13 the Red Army took Rõuge and Võru without any notable fighting.
The battle in the Tartu area was now ready to reach its climax. Soviet forces continued to advance from Võrumaa through to Põlva and despite a number of spirited defensive battles by the Germans and Estonians by August 16 the Soviet forces were closing in on the otherwise quiet university town of Tartu, prompting the army group “Nord” chief of staff to report that “a great calamity will befall us at Tartu and there is nothing we can do about it”. In a desperate effort to shore up the defence of Tartu additional forces, headed by the “Nederland” division commander Jürgen Wagner, were brought from Narva and included three Estonian battle groups headed by Paul Vent, Paul Maitla, Friedrich Kurg, Enn Rannik, Alfons Rebane, A. Sepp and Leon Degrelle commanding the “Wallonie” battalion.
These additional forces hadn’t even arrived yet when the Red Army began their assault on Tartu. Despite valiant efforts to stop the onslaught by August 25 the defenders were fighting street battles with Red Army soldiers in Tartu itself.
The situation was now critical. Having established a bridgehead at Tartu the Soviet forces were now ready to move north to Narva. It appeared that it would be only a matter of days before the Red Army would be in all of Estonia.
As the Red Army advanced, stories of burning, looting, murder and rape spread quickly. Roads leading west began to fill up with refugees heading nowhere in particular except away from the enemy. Heino Susi writes:
Farms were abandoned. Soldiers on the front line found notes on the tables of deserted farm houses: “Estonian boys, take everything you need, leave nothing to the Russians”. (To be continued)