ESTONIA 1944 (1)
Archived Articles | 14 Aug 2002  | EWR
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The year 1944 was fateful for the Estonians and the Republic of Estonia. Occupied first by the Russians four years earlier, then occupied by the Germans in 1941, in the chaos of World War II a desperate and heroic effort was made in 1944 to save what could be saved of Estonia’s independence. The following article by Priit Aruvald follows the events of that crucial year in Estonia’s history.

In January of 1944 the war in Europe had changed dramatically. The Allied armies had met with success after success against the Germans, the U-boat was defeated, the Western Powers had control of the air over the Reich sending in thousand plane raids by day and by night. German forces had been badly defeated in Russia and the Mediterranean with over a million men killed in the previous year. The Wehrmacht had depleted its resources fighting the invasion in the Mediterranean, Italy had collapsed and Hitler had been forced to place as many divisions in Southern Europe as he had in the West.

Nazi Germany, however, was still far from defeat. The Germans had been driven back by the Red Army from the Volga to the Dnieper but the Soviet forces were stalled five hundred miles from the German border. In Italy the Allied advance had been brought to a halt by terrain and fierce resistance from the Wehrmacht and the Nazis still held the western coast of Europe, daily strengthening their defensive forces on the Atlantic Wall. The output of the German armament industry was at an unprecedented high level and there were rumours of new weapons being developed such as jet-propelled aircraft and even possibly an atomic bomb.

To the north, the Red Army had positioned itself near Leningrad at the Oranienbaum bridgehead where they intended to not only break the blockade of Leningrad but also to reoccupy Estonia and take control of the Finnish Gulf. On January 14 the Red Army began its assault on Leningrad. The German 18th Army considered the Leningrad front to be a passive one and consequently little attention was paid to it. Thus, the German “Nord” division, having sat in the trenches for two years without having to fight a single battle, was undermanned and under equipped and completely demoralized. When the Germans realized that the Red Army was planning to break through at Leningrad the “Nordland” and “Nederland” divisions as well as the 20th Estonian Division, which had been fighting in the Nevel region, were brought up but it was to no avail. Within a week, from January 20 to February 2, German army columns were retreating to Estonia through Narva as the front advanced. On February 1, the Soviets launched their first air raid against the evacuated border town of Narva and once again Narva was to be the focal point of two opposing armies.

The German High Command was starting to wonder if it was possible to defend Estonia at all. Dr. Hjalmar Mäe, leader of the German installed puppet Self Government of Estonia (which was subservient to the German Commissar General Karl S. Litzmann, who in turn answered to Reich Minister Alfred Rosenberg), was notified at the end of January by the commander of the “Nord” division General Georg von Keuchler that he had orders to retreat from Estonia within the week and proposed that Dr. Mäe should evacuate as well. Dr. Mäe, however, made a counter proposal, namely that if he were to immediately carry out a mobilization of Estonian men in order to stabilize the front, would the Germans delay their retreat at least until the summer. With great difficulty Dr. Mäe and Inspector General Johannes Soodla at a meeting in Riga had the Germans finally agree to their proposal but fearing the presence of a large armed force of Estonian men in their midst, the mobilization was limited to a maximum of at first only 7,000 men, then 12,000 and after some persuasion finally 15,000 men. In discussing the situation with his colleagues, Dr. Mäe was criticized for not demanding the recognition of Estonian independence from the Germans in return for providing the German army with Estonian men but Dr. Mäe had argued that this was not the time to be looking to achieve political goals when the country was in danger of being overrun by the Red Army.

Previous mobilizations, most recently in October November of 1943, had not been particularly successful. In general, the local population was against any kind of cooperation with the occupying German army. However, the situation by early 1944 had changed considerably. This time men were being called up to directly defend Estonia’s borders. The mobilization was announced on January 30. An editorial of February 6 in the newspaper “Eesti Sõna” said in part:

“If we now miss this opportunity to fight, then the work and sacrifice of our forefathers has been meaningless...Those who would attempt to somehow sneak away and not fulfill their duty would only be helping the enemy...it would be an offence against our efforts to save our homeland and would be just as criminal as raising your hand against your own people.” Prof. Jüri Uluots, the last prime minister of the Republic of Estonia, also gave his support to the mobilization. As a result, the draft wildly exceeded expectations. By most estimates approximately 40,000 men as well as women had signed up. The Germans promised that the Estonians would be formed into national units and the two Estonian divisions formed would be commanded by Estonians. Their uniforms were to be those of the Wehrmacht and not the SS. Neither promise was kept.

NARVA

The situation for the Germans at Narva in early 1944 was shaky at best. Their defence line, given the name “Panther”, existed only on paper. German forces retreating from Leningrad were put to work organizing the line. On February 2 the Red Army arrived at the Narva River and after several failed attempts were finally able to establish a bridgehead across the river on February 12. The defending Germans managed to contain the breakthrough but only barely. It was into this precarious and dangerous situation that the first Estonian units began to arrive. By agreement, while the mobilization was underway in Estonia, Estonian units fighting in the German army on other fronts were brought back to Estonia. Together with the German units, the forces on the Narva front included the “Nordland” and “Nederland” divisions, the “Norge” and “Danmark” regiments, the 20th Estonian Division, the “Narva” battalion, the “East Prussia” 11th infantry division, various police battalions and Self Defence units, the recently formed Viljandi and Tartu Border Defense units as well as the new “Estonian Regiment Tallinn”.

The Russians had not only broken through at Narva but were also preparing to advance into southern Estonia from behind Lake Peipsi. The first assault took place on February 14 and despite the overwhelming forces at the command of the Red Army, the Germans together with the Estonian Division under the command of Major Harald Riipalu, which was actually on its way to Narva, managed to force the invaders from Estonian territory by February 17. German appreciation, however, for the contribution of the Estonians was short in coming. Riipalu recalls:

“On February 15 a late night radio (German) broadcast announced that ‘As a result of two days of fighting the last resistance of the red units forcing their way onto Estonian territory across Peipsi was broken today on the Peipsi shore in Meeripalu. Together with our grenadiers there fought a few Estonian volunteers.’ This announcement was cause for a justified heated protest in the battalion and our German comrades in arms got to hear some ‘strong words’. Leaving Meeripalu I presented an appropriate note to the division commander who promised to pass it on to High Command. An especially strongly worded protest also went to headquarters from our own division commander in Narva whom I had kept informed of events by telephone. There was no overt response to our protest notes but they showed that Estonian soldiers demanded a fair appraisal.”

Career diplomat and at the time Director of Courts in the Self Government Oskar Mamers remarks on this same attitude of the Germans toward the Estonians: “...I saw behind the German generals’ attitude their opinion of Major Rebane and the men of his battalion who had saved General Lindemann’s army from being completely encircled and had prevented the conquest of Estonia by the bolsheviks already in February 1944. If the Germans (Nazis) had given their Knights’ Crosses to Estonians on the same basis as they gave them to Germans, then the number given to Estonians wouldn’t have been limited to the ones given Major (later Colonel) Rebane, Riipalu and a few others, but a few zeros would have had to have been added to that number.”

The situation on the Narva front in mid-February was one of confusion. As the first mobilized units began to arrive, German command had no real idea as to what to do with them. Using the earlier formed Estonian Brigade as a model, new regiments and battalions were quickly formed as a result of which many Estonian men, without realizing it, became soldiers in the Waffen SS. The first units, despite inadequate training and equipment, were put into action on February 13 at Meriküla, where a Red Army assault force was attempting a landing. In the ensuing battle, Estonian forces had the assault force defeated by the next day, in the process impressing the German commanders with their fighting zeal. After the battle, interrogated Red Army prisoners revealed that their commander, Major Stepan Maslov, had been given the following orders:

“After the successful landing, the task of the landing party is to destroy everything that comes across their path. This includes the civilian population. Women and children must also be considered as the enemy. No prisoners are to be taken.”

Despite the defeat at Meriküla, the Red Army continued pressing forward bringing up additional divisions from the rear. The weakening defending army managed to contain the advance but was able to stabilize the front only in the second half of February with the arrival of new German units. The situation was so critical that the Estonian newspapers, including the military newspaper “Rindeleht”, carried very little news of the fighting fearing that it would create a panic. “It felt,” writes Ants Kõverjalg, “like the entire eastern front was about to collapse and the enemy was going to pour into Estonia with smothering force.”

The Red Army’s priority was to retain its bridgehead across the Narva River, since it was from here that the planned decisive blow against the Wehrmacht was being staged. Consequently, it was imperative for the Wehrmacht that the bridgehead be destroyed. On February 24, which happened to be Estonia’s Independence Day and which undoubtedly had an inspiring effect on the Estonian units, a counter attack was launched which resulted in the destruction of the bridgehead near the village of Riigi. Following the battle, Estonian legionnaires wrote in “Eesti Sõna”: “Today we Estonians have given our first answer to the bolsheviks, who wanted to level our homeland and murder our women and children. Today’s bloodbath in Riigi was thorough. It is the only language the enemy understands.”

At Vaasa -Vepsküla-Siivertsi the Red Army bridgehead was also liquidated after heavy and bloody fighting with the 45th and 46th Estonian regiments in the forefront led by Harald Riipalu and Ain Mere respectively and commanded by Lt. Colonel Paul Vent and units from the ‘Nordland’ and ‘Danmark’ divisions. Here a noncommissioned officer named Harald Nugiseks, having taken charge of a small assault troop after the unit’s officers were killed, in savage hand-to-hand fighting made a breach in the communist lines at Vepsküla wiping out the bridgehead there and securing a vital north-south road saving Mere’s and Riipalu’s units on his flanks from certain destruction. For his gallantry Nugiseks was only the second Estonian to be awarded the Knights’ Cross, Col. Alfons Rebane being the first to receive one for bravery at the battle of Novgorod in January 1944.

The loss of the bridgehead was a setback for the Red Army. Nevertheless, a new massive assault was planned and all together three army groups were brought to the Narva front. Preceding this assault, the Red Army began to carry out a series of bombing campaigns in Estonia. The first target was Narva on March 6, even though the city had been evacuated and was empty. One casualty, however, was the monument to the Swedish King Karl XII, at the base of which was inscribed: “Here stood Karl XII directing the battle of Narva, November 20, 1700". The next targets were the railway junctions in Jõhvi and Tapa. On March 9, a terror bombing was carried out against Tallinn, the capital of Estonia.

(To be continued)

 
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Maimu Molder19 Aug 2002 07:17
Great article, very informative. It really brings to light how complicated and chaotic these times were. The situation was not as 'black and white' as Mr. Zuroff seems to believe.

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