In Moscow, Geopolitics is the scientific Communism of today (2)
Archived Articles | 30 Sep 2005 | Paul GobleEWR
TARTU – For many Russian analysts, geopolitics now fills the gap left by the collapse of Soviet Marxism, providing them with yet another simplified model of a world divided between good and evil and encouraging them to believe that Moscow remains a far more central player in world affairs than is in fact the case.
And just like the earlier Soviet theory, Boris Kagarlitskiy argues in the current issue of „Svobodnaya mysl’—XXI,” this Manichean vision of the world not only distorts their interpretation of what is taking place but renders most of their recommendations meaningless and wrong.
In Soviet times, the often-controversial director of the Moscow Institute of Globalization says, „official Marxist ideology functioned as a kind of civil religion.” Its rigidity and sterility lead to its collapse, along with the system that created it, but its departure from the scene did not eliminate the desire of many people for an analogous faith.
And consequently, he writes, many of them have turned to geopolitical doctrines which, like „the scientific communism” that so many of them accepted in the past, divide the world into a „good” Russia surrounded by a permanently and ineluctably „evil” world focused on nothing except the destruction of the Russian Federation.
„Precisely this stereotypical and universally applicable quality made geopolitical thought not simply attractive but [almost] an ideal replacement for the old dogmatism, „ Kagarlitskiy continues, especially since it posits a division of the world largely unchanged from the 1970s and the continuing centrality of Russia and themselves in that world.
„Instead of analyzing the real – and changing – interests of countries and their ruling elites and thinking seriously about the contradictions of contemporary society and the global economy,” he says, „the [geopolitical] ideologues tell one another terrible stories [about the threats facing their country] and then, without any basis, promise a happy ending.”
There is „nothing mysterious” in the current international situation, the Moscow commentator suggests. „The problem is only that it cannot be described by a simple binary formula of ‚we’ and ‚they,’” as geopoliticians in the Russian Federation and some other countries continue to do.
Instead, he insists, current political conflicts have their roots in economic competition between the major centers of world capitalism, the United States on the one hand and the Euro zone on the other, with each nervous about the rising power of China but not much concerned about Russia except as a supplier of raw materials.
„No one intends to dismember Russia,” Kagarlitskiy writes, „but no one is [much] agitated about [the need for] the preservation of its territorial integrity either,” a situation that Russian geopoliticians find impossible to accept because of what it says about the declining power of their country in the world.
And their failure to do so, he continues, is reflected both in their choice of gurus and prophets and in the mistakes they make about what the United States and other international powers are doing in their dealings with Moscow and with countries situated around the edge of the Russian Federation.
„Like any religion,” Kagarlitskiy says, „geopolitics needs to have its own prophets,” and if one reads „the Russian patriotic press,” it is almost impossible not to conclude that „its chief ideologue” is Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor and a frequent commentator on Russian affairs.
The reasons for that paradoxical conclusion, Kagarlitskiy argues, should be obvious. On the one hand, many Russian political writers today got their start as specialists on scientific communism at the time when Brzezinski was in office, and they continue to operate on the basis of what they knew then rather than attempting to keep up.
And on the other, Brzezinski’s hostility toward Russia, which Kagarlitskiy characterizes as a form of Russophobia, makes his ideas „unbelievably interesting for and close to the hearts of Russian patriots.” His views on Russia, they know, are extremely „negative” but at least he continues to treat Russia as being at the center of world affairs.
„For [Russian] patriots,” Kagarlitskiy writes, „this is a balm for their wounds,” and consequently, „the Russophobic paranoia of the American politician of Polish origin” somewhat unexpectedly but entirely logically „combines with the neo-Slavophile paranoia of numerous Moscow publicists.”
But the fascination of Moscow’s geopolitical writers with Brzezinski, their willingness to believe that whatever he writes is current American policy rather than a reflection of the ideas of the Cold War, gets these authors into no end of trouble when they try to understand the very different world of the present day, Kagarlitskiy insists.
Indeed, he writes, „judging the policies of contemporary American by the reflections of a retiree of the Carter Administration is the equivalent of predicting the politics of President Putin on the basis of articles by General L[eonid] Ivashov or the theories of A[leksandr] Dugin.”
And in his article, Kagarlitskiy provides two examples of what he has in mind. First, he says, Russian geopoliticians completely misunderstand American policies about NATO, viewing the expansion of the alliance eastward and U.S. bases in former Soviet republics as part of a continuing effort to rein in Russia.
Today, he writes, „Washington needs NATO as an instrument which it can use to subordinate to itself the force structures and when possible the foreign policies of its former ‚Cold War’ allies,” particularly among European countries who currently challenge the U.S. economically and politically.
Indeed, Kagarlitskiy says, one of the greatest failures of the geopoliticians is that they continue to speak of a single undivided „West,” instead of recognizing that the U.S. and Europe have very different interests not only about the world as a whole but with respect to the Russian Federation specifically.
Expanding NATO eastward gave the U.S. new leverage against the older members of the Alliance, he argues, and the establishment of bases in Central Asia had less to do with any plans to „contain” Russia than it does with efforts to put the U.S. in a position to restrict the geopolitical rise of China.
And second, the geopoliticians completely misunderstand America’s support for „orange”-style revolutions in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. They invariably view these as intended to put pro-American governments in place and thus to undermine Russian influence across the region.
Neither of these views is true, Kagarlitskiy insists, at least in the simplified form that the geopoliticians usually outline. He notes that in every case, the regimes that the U.S. worked to overthrow – such as Eduard Shevardnadze’s in Georgia and Leonid Kuchma’s in Ukraine - generally had been doing precisely what Washington wanted.
The U.S. sponsored the revolutions against them then not so much to promote policy change as to ensure its continuity. „In essence,” Kagarlitskiy concludes, „Washington acted to maintain the status quo” because it understands „that for policy to remain unchanged, one must [from time to time] change its executors.”
That hardly represents the kind of planned campaign against Russia that geopoliticians inevitably suggest is taking place via these revolutions. After all, Kagarlitskiy notes, Moscow fears „any serious changes in the post-Soviet space” and is trying just as hard as the Americans to prevent any of them from taking place.
But the tactics Moscow has adopted are just the reverse of Washington’s, Kagarlitskiy continues. The Kremlin, he says, has decided that „it is necessary to oppose any transformations, to support existing regimes at any price, and to struggle to the last with all its forces. [Or] as people used to say, not one step backward.”
Washington’s policy is far more flexible than Moscow’s and thus has been more effective so far, but it is entirely possible that it may prove more successful over time, especially given the likelihood that the U.S. is likely to continue to shift its focus away from this region.
If Russian geopoliticians would focus on these realities, on how different the world is now from what it was when the Soviet Union existed and when the world was divided between two blocs, they might be able to make some useful suggestions about what the Kremlin could do next, Kagarlitskiy concludes.
But because they will not face the unpleasant fact that the world has changed, that the Moscow is not as important as it used to be, Kagarlitskiy concludes, their proposals are likely to remain just as useless and counterproductive as those generated by followers of „scientific communism” in the last years of Soviet power.
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I just walked past the great man today! He's pretty tall, and seems to be very much in his own thoughts, which is probably why he is able to think so clearly and articulate himself as well as he does. In any case I think Estonia won more than it appreciates when this hunk of an intellect decided on coming here to live.
Lugesin huviga hr Paul Goble artiklit.
Lisan oma kommentaari /kahes osas/ - Demokraatia Läänes ja Putini diktatuuris.
Moto: Demokraatia aluseks on luua aktiivne ja sõltumatu kodanikuühiskond.
Demokraatia tähedab seadustamist ja kaitsmist...
Demokraatia võtmeteguriteks on ka iroonia ja huumorimeel. John Keane
Alustan kommentaari mõne lõiguga Westminster`i Ülikooli politoloogia professori John Keane`i sõnavõtust Avatud Eesti Fondi Demokraatia Foorumil Tallinnas 23. Apr 2004. aastal.
"Iga noor demokraatia vajab sõprade toetust..." sõnas USA President G.W.Bush ÜRO-s 23. Sept 2003.a.
Sellele lausele lisab John Keane " ... kuid teistele (riikidele) abistava käe ulatamine nõuab ka oskust - lasta õigel ajal käest lahti...".
Arutelus on välja toodud termin "demokraatia" üks selgitustest: "Demokraatia on elustiil ja valitsemise vorm, kus neid kes trügivad valitsema - on võimalik kõrvaldada; kus võim on avalikult kontrollitav ja kus on äärmiselt raske troonil istuda ja teiste selja taga otsuseid teha..."
Kasutades metafoorilist stiili "...selline taimeliik nagu demokraatlik valitsus vajab kasvuks ökosüsteemi ning ülemaailmsete jõudude surve tõttu - vajab "biosfääri" , mis võimaldaks tal kasvada ja õitseda...". Näidetena on toodud peale II Maailmasõda G.Marshall`i (Nobeli Rahupreemia 1953) Plaani abil arendatud Saksamaa, Jaapani, Itaalia, ja osaliselt ka Prantsusmaa, Kreeka ja Türgi riikluse kujunemine ja NATO loomise initsiatiiv.
Nüüd on huvitav jätkata väga olulise sündmusega Eestis; Tallinnas Olümpia hotellis korraldati ATA - 51, s.o. General Assambly of the Atlantic Treaty Association Tallinn, Sept 28th - 30th 2005, Deviisiks "Demokraatia ja inimõigused - NATO uus missioon".
Osalesin valikuliselt Tallinn ATA-51 Assamblee plenaaristungitel, kus hästi esinesid kindral Wesley K. Clark, Eesti Suursaadik USA-s hr. Jüri Luik ja telesilla kaudu Brüsselist USA Saadik NATO juures Ms Victoria Nuland.
Teised esinejad jäid märgatavalt kahvatumaks ja mitmed olulised persoonid "hoidsid madalat profiili".
Gruusia, Ukraina, Moldova, Makedoonia, Horvaatia delegaadid esinesid vaoshoitult - lootustega ka edasisele NATO toetusele.
Kõlama jäid terminid "moraalne", "stabiilsus", "tsiviliseeritus", "pragmaatiline", "realistlik", - ja teised lootustandvad mõisted.
Väga kasulik ja õpetlik oli külalisena osaleda ATA - 51 Assambleel ja tunnetada NATO arenguid.
Jagan kommentaari kaheks osaks!
Lugupidamisega
Mati Pungas, Tallinn 1.Okt 2005 konsultant-analüütik
Lisan oma kommentaari /kahes osas/ - Demokraatia Läänes ja Putini diktatuuris.
Moto: Demokraatia aluseks on luua aktiivne ja sõltumatu kodanikuühiskond.
Demokraatia tähedab seadustamist ja kaitsmist...
Demokraatia võtmeteguriteks on ka iroonia ja huumorimeel. John Keane
Alustan kommentaari mõne lõiguga Westminster`i Ülikooli politoloogia professori John Keane`i sõnavõtust Avatud Eesti Fondi Demokraatia Foorumil Tallinnas 23. Apr 2004. aastal.
"Iga noor demokraatia vajab sõprade toetust..." sõnas USA President G.W.Bush ÜRO-s 23. Sept 2003.a.
Sellele lausele lisab John Keane " ... kuid teistele (riikidele) abistava käe ulatamine nõuab ka oskust - lasta õigel ajal käest lahti...".
Arutelus on välja toodud termin "demokraatia" üks selgitustest: "Demokraatia on elustiil ja valitsemise vorm, kus neid kes trügivad valitsema - on võimalik kõrvaldada; kus võim on avalikult kontrollitav ja kus on äärmiselt raske troonil istuda ja teiste selja taga otsuseid teha..."
Kasutades metafoorilist stiili "...selline taimeliik nagu demokraatlik valitsus vajab kasvuks ökosüsteemi ning ülemaailmsete jõudude surve tõttu - vajab "biosfääri" , mis võimaldaks tal kasvada ja õitseda...". Näidetena on toodud peale II Maailmasõda G.Marshall`i (Nobeli Rahupreemia 1953) Plaani abil arendatud Saksamaa, Jaapani, Itaalia, ja osaliselt ka Prantsusmaa, Kreeka ja Türgi riikluse kujunemine ja NATO loomise initsiatiiv.
Nüüd on huvitav jätkata väga olulise sündmusega Eestis; Tallinnas Olümpia hotellis korraldati ATA - 51, s.o. General Assambly of the Atlantic Treaty Association Tallinn, Sept 28th - 30th 2005, Deviisiks "Demokraatia ja inimõigused - NATO uus missioon".
Osalesin valikuliselt Tallinn ATA-51 Assamblee plenaaristungitel, kus hästi esinesid kindral Wesley K. Clark, Eesti Suursaadik USA-s hr. Jüri Luik ja telesilla kaudu Brüsselist USA Saadik NATO juures Ms Victoria Nuland.
Teised esinejad jäid märgatavalt kahvatumaks ja mitmed olulised persoonid "hoidsid madalat profiili".
Gruusia, Ukraina, Moldova, Makedoonia, Horvaatia delegaadid esinesid vaoshoitult - lootustega ka edasisele NATO toetusele.
Kõlama jäid terminid "moraalne", "stabiilsus", "tsiviliseeritus", "pragmaatiline", "realistlik", - ja teised lootustandvad mõisted.
Väga kasulik ja õpetlik oli külalisena osaleda ATA - 51 Assambleel ja tunnetada NATO arenguid.
Jagan kommentaari kaheks osaks!
Lugupidamisega
Mati Pungas, Tallinn 1.Okt 2005 konsultant-analüütik
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