In Vladimir Putin’s mythology, the 1990s were a dark and shameful period, a time when Russia was on its knees before Western governments and greedy oligarchs. The official propaganda tone was set by Mr. Putin’s infamous 2007 speech at Luzhniki in which he demonized former Russian leaders for “acting against the state” and accused the pro-democracy opposition of “groveling at foreign embassies.” This line (which ignores the fact that, under Mr. Putin, the levels of corruption and lawlessness have far exceeded anything seen in the 1990s) is obligingly parroted by state-run television.
The only exceptions come during the short periods of mourning for the passing of those who led Russia during her first tumultuous years of independence. With deference to the old tradition — “of the dead, speak no ill” — TV channels tune down their propaganda and show archival news footage of the days when elections still mattered, when parliament was still a place for discussion, and when governments may have been unstable and weak, but never oppressive or purposefully cruel. So it was after the passing of former president Boris Yeltsin in 2007, so it was after the death of former prime minister Yegor Gaidar in 2009, and so it was last week, after the passing of Viktor Chernomyrdin, who led Russia’s government from 1992 to 1998 and was once considered a likely future president.
As with the passing of Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Gaidar, Mr. Chernomyrdin’s death created a rare unity among opposites, with simultaneous condolences from regime officials and leaders of the opposition. It is hard to imagine a common cause between President Dmitri Medvedev and political prisoner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, yet both issued statements on the passing of the former prime minister — one from the Kremlin, the other from Matrosskaya Tishina prison. “I knew him as a decent and kind man — a rarity in modern politics”, Mr. Khodorkovsky wrote in his letter of condolence.
Mr. Chernomyrdin’s presidential prospects were quashed (ironically, given what followed) by the democratic nature of the Russian political system of the 1990s. In August 1998, after the Asian financial meltdown and the historically low prices of oil (around $12 per barrel) led to the collapse of Russian markets and a government default, President Yeltsin decided to bring in an old hand to stabilize the situation, asking Mr. Chernomyrdin to return to the prime minister’s seat from which he was dismissed earlier that year. It was understood that he would return not just as prime minister, but as president-in-waiting, with increased executive powers and with a view to the 2000 election. Twice — first by a vote of 94–253, then by 138–273 — the State Duma (the lower house of parliament), dominated by left-wing opponents of the president, rejected Mr. Chernomyrdin’s nomination. The result was the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov — one of three former security service chiefs who would serve as Boris Yeltsin’s last prime ministers. The next two were Sergei Stepashin and Vladimir Putin.