Laas Leivat
Russia’s egregious abuse of Interpol’s info-sharing services is boldfaced harassment, but still mild compared to the Kremlin’s more aggressive transnational repression activities abroad. It relies on assassination, targeting former government insiders and all others considered to be threats to the Putin regime.
Augmenting the elimination of likely opponents is the control of key cultural institutions active abroad, thus influencing the diaspora. Preventing exiles from reaching domestic audiences with a counter-Kremlin narrative is a priority. The Kremlin has thus reassured itself that opposition activities abroad are not a danger if they lack domestic influence.
Observers see this as the Kremlin’s lack of ambition to make “overseas Russians” an overt tool of state control and power – as along as they don’t attempt to feed anti-Kremlin sentiment among compatriots at home. More important, Russian rabble-rousers in foreign locations aren’t a threat provided they’re not affiliated with foreign intelligence services.
Those who are identified as a genuine menace become targets of the clandestine services’ ‘mokroye delo’ (wet affairs) capabilities. Although China appears to focus on a wide spectrum of dissidents abroad for harassment and intimidation, it’s suggested Russia fixes in on a narrower range but undertakes a more violent solution. Russia, more than any other state, uses assassination as a tool of transnational repression – at least ten from 2014 to 2021 summer. This total is insignificant when compared to outright domestic assassinations, disappearances and ‘suicides’ from tall buildings inside Russia.