New and Old Europe are hardly American labels — it is more who is with us, and who is against us. The dividing line seems to be Iraq. The New Europe supports the US, Old is against. Few choose to consider Russia as a divisive force, a reason why Europe is split.
New Europe has cause to fear the resurgent, unchecked Russia. As Putin’s hold on power is solidly cemented, the international media regularly hoodwinked by Putin’s spinmasters, few outside of New Europe seem to be concerned about what the future may hold. Old Europe, on the other hand, sees Russia as their source of readily accessible oil and gas. Moscow can do little wrong in the eyes of Paris and Berlin. Indeed, Moscow is seen as an ally against Washington and the New Diplomacy as practiced in the USA.
Moscow is unlikely to march into Berlin again, much less Paris. But New Europeans warn against complacency — because Russia’s influence in its borderlands is contributing to a shaky insecurity. Europe does not see the situation from a united perspective — the recent collapse of the EU constitution talks in Brussels merely confirmed the continental divide.
France and Germany are choosing to accept what Putin presents as opposed to the economic truth. Russia is far from being a democracy — the oilgarchy, a new word coined to describe the oligarchs running the oil and gas bizness, pulls the strings of the nation’s economy.
While Paris and Berlin may consider Putin to be a credible statesman, the view is not shared in the New Europe. As Stefan Theil notes in “Newseek International” (Jan. 5), to East Europeans, Putin is an ex-KGB authoritarian “whose new coalition in the Duma includes both the aggressively nationalist new Homeland party and the rising Liberal Democratic Party of the notoriously xenophobic Vladimir Zhirinovsky. All speak of extending Russian influence”.
Russia’s “near abroad” has seen failures in statehood — Moldova and Belarus are the obvious examples, Ukraine close behind. Then there is Königsberg, or the Kaliningrad region, a Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea. Squeezed between Poland and Lithuania, it is an economic disaster zone, a regional hub of organized crime — and a major Russian military base. True democracies such as the Baltic Republics have reason to fear that a resurgent Russia, emboldened by the appeasement-minded French and Germans, might be given more room to operate in the region.
The instability in the area beyond New Europe is worrisome, the attitudes of Old Europe are equally troubling. This is what is dividing Old from New, more than anything else. It is a wedge, nothing less. Theil quotes Estonia’s former foreign minister, now member of the Riigikogu, Toomas Hendrik Ilves addressing the perceived and overstated schism that the stand over Iraq has created. “We are much closer to the other members of the EU in our relations with the United States than people think. The real problem splitting Old and New Europe is the West’s dangerous, naive and appeasement-minded attitude toward Russia.”
Remember the reluctance with which Moscow accepted the independence of the East European and Baltic states after the collapse of communism — an event spearheaded by Balts. Even today, it wages a diplomatic war with Latvia, home to a large Russian minority for whom Moscow claims to speak. Are the Balts paranoid? Latvians say they are just being realistic.
It’s not a military attack that worries them. Direct armed engagement is
not likely — for at least the next decade, according to analysts. More important is Russia’s attitude toward the unstable and collapsing states on its borders.
In the EU’s dealings with an increasingly authoritarian Russia many issues have been avoided — a classic symptom of appeasement. When the Kremlin was pushing Brussels for visa free travel from Russia to Kaliningrad through Lithuania, an agreement was only narrowly averted, thanks to intense Baltic pressure, who worried that such a deal would result in
a surge in smuggling, organized crime and immigration. Negotiations for a general free-travel agreement continue, despite local objections. When Berlin and Paris allied with Moscow against Washington over Iraq without consulting their future EU partners in the east, Warsaw and Prague were reminded of past dealings by the big boys.
Then there is the Chechnya issue. Of note is that Chechens rank third in percentage population losses due to war and terror since the start of the 20th century. Only Jews and Roma have suffered more, but the west is indifferent. At the EU-Russia summit in Rome in November, EU heads of government dismissed the European Commission’s recommendation that Russia be reprimanded over what human-rights organizations have identified as genocide in Chechnya.
Iraq, Afghanistan, transatlantic and antiterror issues will likely lose significance for New Europeans within the EU. Theil again turns to Ilves. “All our best minds are on foreign policy now,” says Ilves. “But once we’re in the Union, we’ll all be busy calculating fishing quotas and understanding competition policy.” Yet Russia remains the flaming issue that no farming subsidy can smother. “The Eastern Europeans will not get into another battle with France and Germany on U.S. policy,” Ilves predicts. “But if we see the EU pursuing policies with Russia that threaten us, we’re going to speak up.”
Trouble is, today’s inward-looking EU has no strategy on how to stabilize
Russia beyond the present appeasement. Much less decide what to do with the tinderkegs smouldering in the Balkans, Moldova, Belarus. Look for New Europeans to excercise every opportunity to force such a strategy to be developed.
Appeasement invoves concessions in response to either explicit or implied threats — acting as a detriment to states, such as the New Europe, who do not threaten. The policy of appeasement, as systematically pursued by Chamberlain and the UK in the 1930’s, facilitated Hitler’s accumulation of power. More importantly, from Yalta on, appeasement accounted for the USSR’s accumulation of power after WW II. Curious how fast some forget history’s lessons in the Old Europe.
Rather than the labels of New versus Old, perhaps practical conscience, versus entrenched economic interests and appeasement, might be the proper label to apply to the split Europe of today.
Leader: The new appeasement
Arvamus
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