HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE SERIES
By Vello Ederma
Washington (1976/2007)
Introduction:
The following article on the so-called “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine” was written in 1976, at the time the “doctrine” was leaked to the media. The article could not be published at the time without repercussions. The “doctrine” shows the duality, or let’s say the duplicity, of American foreign policy at the time toward the Soviet Union and Russia. It increases manifold the importance of pressures exerted by East European lobby groups on Congress and the White House. It had been necessary for decades to make sure that millions of people were not sold out to the Soviets, while keeping alive their hopes for liberation.
It should be stressed that there were overriding issues of U.S. national interest and security that legitimately focused on the bipolar power relationship in the nuclear age, relegating the subjugated Europeans to secondary foreign policy roles. It should be noted as well that the Eastern Europeans had many influential friends and proponents in the U.S. Government and especially Congress. There were constant internal battles over the duality of power politics and self-determination.
While promulgating the Atlantic Charter, self-determination, the Baltic non-recognition and countless other declarations in support of peoples enslaved by Communism, there were those in high positions, including presidents themselves, who were trying to find ways to bypass the declared policies. They were often aided by the suggestions of middle level officials who continued to stress the need to keep the Soviet Union intact, advising against any action or words that could lead to a breakup. They had an effect as late as the very early Nineties, when President George H.W. Bush (“Bush 41”) delivered the infamous “Chicken Kiev” speech telling Ukraine not to break from the USSR, hesitated too long to reaffirm U.S. diplomatic recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and did not react forcibly to the blood shed on the streets of Vilnius.
Uncle Joe
I do not agree with those who claim that the U.S. betrayed the Baltic peoples with promises not kept. There were no specific promises of aid for liberation made. There were, of course, lofty declarations that never materialized because of President Roosevelt’s almost total, sickening affection for “Uncle Joe” Stalin, in blatant disregard for his own (pro-American!) advisers, Winston Churchill, the American people and the millions in the Soviet Union, the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. He also had an egotistical, but totally misguided, belief in his own ability to persuade Stalin to do his bidding. It is also necessary to emphasize that Roosevelt was a sick man with dictatorial power to conduct the most devastating war of the Twentieth Century. Documents and various conference records show that Roosevelt gave Stalin just about everything he wanted and more, often shutting out and actually making fun of Churchill.
Churchill himself was, without ambiguities, for Baltic independence. In his 1950 book, “The Grand Alliance,” he wrote: “I was much disturbed by the reports /…/ of Soviet territorial ambitions, especially in the Baltic States. /…/ There was no doubt however where the right lay. The Baltic States should be sovereign independent peoples.”
However, Roosevelt held all the trumps, both in the case of the British as well as the Soviets. Both needed the war materiel from America via Lend-Lease. Soviet Marshall Georgi Zhukov, in his memoirs, states clearly that the Soviet Union would not have won the war without U.S. help. Therefore, I do not entirely buy the excuse given at times by American and other officials about the heroics of the Red Army and the Soviet people. The assumed twenty million dead on the Soviet side included the subjugated nationalities, the slaves in the gulag, the Russian and other peoples murdered on Stalin’s orders and Red Army’s order of battle which had no quarter for its own soldiers.
The United States Department of State, in a “Historical Background” statement by the Bureau of Public Affairs in 2005, “The United States, the Soviet Union and the End of World War Two,” summed up its assessment in the very last sentence as follows: “Despite the subsequent postwar controversies and the beginning of the Cold War, nothing can diminish the importance of the wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.” A great deal can be read into that sentence.
Non-Recognition
It is all the more significant and actually surprising that non-recognition was born in the midst of this scenario. It had nothing to do with a special status being accorded to the three small countries. After all, Roosevelt patted Stalin on the back at Tehran and “jokingly” (as stated in the transcript) said he would not go to war over them. His only interest was a show by Stalin of some elections because, after all, he had scores of Baltic American voters whose votes he needed.
The bottom line is that the Balts owe a debt of gratitude to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who issued the declaration in 1940. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who was not on duty at the time, may not have been that favorably disposed toward it. For President Roosevelt, it was simply a re-election tool. He even told the Lithuanians that they were mistaken about the loss of independence.
The Balts also owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the Baltic diplomats in the U.S. at the time. They sprung into action immediately and exerted pressure on Welles. Additional thanks go to Baltic American organizations, especially the Lithuanians from Chicago. The almost superhuman efforts the Balts, exerted in the face of a decidedly adverse political climate, brought about the declaration that lasted through decades.
For Baltic American groups, the non-recognition policy became a club worth wielding. It is possible that without it, the Baltic peoples may have had a more difficult time in reasserting independence.
The peoples enslaved by the Soviet Union also owe a debt of gratitude to President Ronald Reagan, who alone had the guts to call the Evil Empire an evil empire. Words do have consequences, because it set in motion the eventual liberation of the slaves and breakup of the Empire. Lastly, gratitude is owed to President George W. Bush, who repudiated the Yalta/Tehran sellouts and opened the way to security via NATO membership.
The Rocky Road and the Presidents
The historical record shows a very rocky road for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States during mid-Twentieth Century in official Washington. To wit:
One needs to start with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who willingly sold millions of people to the Russian Communists. One has to leave out President Harry S. Truman, who saw the light, but was essentially unable to undo Roosevelt’s folly. But then again start with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who assumed office with a deception of rolling back Communism but did nothing first in East Germany and then in Hungary and Poland, thus signaling Moscow that they can do whatever they want. President John F. Kennedy was a disaster with lofty declarations but mousy action in Cuba, the Berlin Wall and starting the debacle in Vietnam.
President Lyndon B. Johnson was another disaster in America’s ineptness in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam. By the time President Richard M. Nixon came to power, America was weak and the Soviet Union was on the march around the world. The Congress had a hand in America’s debacle (not defeat!) in Vietnam by cutting off funds to the South Vietnamese, something the current crop of congresstypes is ready to do in Iraq without learning from the past. One can say that President Gerald R. Ford had no idea what was going on in the world. He wasn’t even sure whether the Soviets were in control in Eastern Europe and had no control over the retreat from Vietnam. Another in the series of White House disasters was President Jimmy Carter, who cautioned us all about our “inordinate fear of Communism” and pulled us out of the Moscow Olympics in grand “retaliation” for Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He had no idea what to do about the seizure of U.S. diplomats in Iran except to send helicopter crews to die in the sand dunes.
At that point, we must take a deep breath and say thank God for Ronald Reagan!
Beyond the coterie of Moscow-lovers around Roosevelt, there were three men who could have created situations that even Ronald Reagan may not have been able to handle. We have praised all of them to an extent, but wrongfully so.
The first was George Kennan, who despite The Long Telegram, was the author of the containment policy. This policy very simply meant that Western Europe had to be protected from Soviet invasion while Eastern Europe along with the Baltic States could remain in bondage. His secret efforts on so-called “rollback” were only half-hearted and bound to fail, sending many young men to their immediate death or slave labor.
The second was Henry Kissinger, who actually suggested to the Soviets that he would rescind the Baltic non-recognition policy. Only the quick action of the Americans of East European and Baltic descent stopped this stupidity when it leaked out.
But the Third Man really “took the cake!”
And so, we come to the third man, Helmut Sonnenfeldt!
As I wrote, word-for-word, in 1976:
The modern Chamberlain of the Seventies, State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt, has now codified his Grand Design for Europe. The leaked document on his presentation to an ambassadorial meeting in London last December (1975) indeed confirms the suspicions of many that the slaves of Eastern Europe must accept their fate. For in the words of Sonnenfeldt, to have those conquered masses think of freedom from Soviet domination would be a threat to peace, to invite World War Three! And all this as we celebrate the Bicentennial of the American Revolution!
Despite denials, attempts to "set the record straight," the convoluted rhetoric, and the verbal garbage from Foggy Bottom, the above conclusion is inescapable.
What makes matters worse is the inability of Washington officialdom to explain it away, for the lies uttered in the first moments of disclosure come back to haunt. For the record, let us just note that the early cries of "distortion, inaccuracy and fabrication" over what has now been aptly dubbed the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," turned later into what Helmut the Great accepted as "a reasonable rendition" of his London presentation.
What begins to puzzle us more is that a State Department spokesman made it clear that Sonnenfeldt "did not present a new policy in his classified remarks in London, but rather an explanation of this policy." Secretary of State Kissinger said he stands by what Sonnenfeldt said. White House spokesman Nessen backed the Sonnenfeldt policy.
But somehow President Ford was again the last to get the word on what has been decided for him as the country's foreign policy. In a Milwaukee beer hall, the President, mustering his courage while away from the influence of Washington, stated that the U.S. policy in no sense accepts Soviet domination of Eastern Europe nor is it designed to permit consolidation of such dominion. Those are fighting words, Mr. President, but apparently Helmut and Henry either can't hear or don't care to listen.
On the other hand, perhaps everyone thought the President was saying the same thing. If it is true, logic would certainly dictate at this point that the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine then is synonymous with the U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
If the logical progression of the argument has reached that point, "Darkness At Noon" has surely fallen over Europe, for the slaves — caught between world championship chess matches of the two superpowers — have indeed no choice but to accept their fate.
Since Sonnenfeldt was officially doing nothing but explaining the existing U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, let us then take a closer look at what the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine is all about.
The Great Manipulator of World Affairs pontificated as follows: "The Soviet's inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure, because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power."
Why, in the name of freedom, independence and self-determination, is Soviet failure to acquire loyalty "unfortunate?" And why is it "doubly tragic" that the Soviets have not established "roots of interest" beyond sheer power in that area? Sonnenfeldt's obvious "logical" conclusion is that the Soviets should do so. And the incredible implication is that communism's slaves in Eastern Europe have not responded with the kind of enthusiasm to Soviet domination that would be to Sonnenfeldt's liking. And is the United States now, despite persistent denials, encouraging the officially-accepted creation of superpower spheres of influence around the world?
Worse is yet to come! To overcome this "doubly tragic" error on the part of Eastern Europeans, the United States must help the Soviets to tighten the noose and fill its Gulag Archipelago. According to the leaked transcript, Sonnenfeldt says the U.S. "seeks to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded on sheer power alone."
Aside from committing the American people to the Soviet enslavement of Eastern Europe, at this point Sonnenfeldt and logic seem to part company. And may one say it is indeed "unfortunate" and "doubly tragic" if this is the reasoning behind actual U.S. foreign policy.
Sonnenfeldt says the policy he has outlined is designed to help the aspirations of Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence because there is no alternative open to the U.S. other than that of influencing the way Soviet power is used. How in the name of Prince Metternich can U.S. policy embrace the incredible "logic" that you first help a totalitarian power to strengthen its hold over other countries -- for the purpose of weakening that hold? One never realized that Foggy Bottom had gotten that foggy! And if attempts to influence the use of Soviet power are the only alternatives left in U.S.-Soviet relations, we are indeed in very bad shape. Just witness Angola.
Then Sonnenfeldt ventures the prognostication that if the present Soviet-East European "unnatural" relationship continues, it is "a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West." Besides, he says this relationship could explode and start World War Three! In other words, the U.S. better help the Soviet Union to beat the East Europeans into an even greater, "organic" subservience to Moscow, or these slaves might still entertain "romantic inclinations" to freedom and thus cause a greater conflict!
In this Bicentennial year we quote Patrick Henry as saying "give me liberty or give me death!" We quote Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. We quote other Founding Fathers and American statesmen on liberty, freedom, slavery, and so on. Are we hypocrites? Do we have a double standard? Are we saying that the Eastern Europeans are not allowed, by decree of Washington and Moscow, to have their own Henrys and Jeffersons? Beyond that, of course, the Eastern Europeans have learned the hard way — in 1953, 1956 and 1968 — that the country of Henry, Jefferson and Lincoln will not come to their aid anyway. What are they thinking now that, thanks to Sonnenfeldt, the U.S. is more than willing to aid Moscow in consolidating its power in that area?
Both Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt have stated that the U.S. will not accept a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. President Ford has found it necessary to repeat that several times. Sonnenfeldt doesn't dispute that. He only says the influence should not be exclusive. Are we liars, is this Orwellian "doublethink?"
In fact, the United States has accepted a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe since the days of the Potsdam Conference. Whether or not we want it to be "exclusive," bears very little resemblance to reality.
It is incredible to hear that in one breath, Sonnenfeldt says the U.S. tries to respond to the aspirations, desires and impulses of the Eastern Europeans. Yet the next gasp of polluted Foggy Bottom rhetoric brings forth help to the Soviets in making sure that Moscow's dominance will not be based on guns alone!
What if the aspiration of Eastern Europeans is to be free of Soviet dominance — and because of this aspiration they resort to the "romantic inclination" to throw off the Moscow yoke by force or some other means? Will this "aspiration" of the Eastern Europeans apply in the Sonnenfeldt context, or is Washington going to send all help to the Soviets to quell the uprising? Or is this another Janus-face of Sonnenfeldt?
The State Counselor is scared of World War Three if the Eastern Europeans lean toward the "romantic inclinations" of Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson and rise for freedom. Yet we send grain and technology at a rapidly increasing rate to the Soviet Union — so the hard-pressed Soviet economy can cope with consumer unrest while diverting the rest of the economy into a buildup of a war machine that has obviously surpassed the U.S. in modernization as well as numbers. What is the logic in that? We are scared of World War Three, yet we do everything to help the Soviets get to the point where they would win World War Three!
And let's not forget that in a possible World War Three scenario, it is precisely the aspirations for freedom and independence by the Eastern Europeans that will make the Russians think twice before starting one. The Russians cannot trust the Eastern Europeans in a conflict situation with the West any more than they can trust their own non-Russian nationalities. Therefore, it is to the advantage of Moscow to chop up the West piecemeal without resorting to armed conflict. Moscow has always respected superior force and would understand its own vulnerabilities enough not to undertake adventures if it knows clearly that the U.S. would stand up to it. Of course, Sonnenfeldt may draw solace from the possibility of Soviet superior strength, leaving the Eastern Europeans without the will or the courage to draw upon America's strength. At that point, their "romantic inclinations" will fade into an even greater apathy than exists in Eastern Europe at this point.
Therefore, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine is indeed, "doubly tragic," for it signals to the Soviets that they can have Eastern Europe to kick around, while giving Moscow help to advance its warmaking capability — perhaps even to the point where someday the U.S. may not even have the one Sonnenfeldt "option" — of trying to influence the use of Soviet superpower.
Since we are dependent so heavily on Western Europe in a major crisis, it would be a folly of major proportions to consolidate Soviet power "beyond sheer force" in Eastern Europe. It is all for the good that the Soviet power there can only be maintained with a gun, for it shows up the major Soviet weakness of not being able to consolidate power by any other means. Is Sonnenfeldt ready to accommodate these "other means?"
There is nothing wrong with keeping the Soviets guessing as to the "romantic inclinations" toward freedom by the Eastern Europeans. For that guessing may well prevent World War Three and could actually fulfill someday the East European "romantic inclinations" that Sonnenfeldt fears.
The most charitable suggestion one could make to the Metternich of Foggy Bottom is that he go back to the drawing boards and start from scratch. Or he could gracefully fade away before the moral basis of American foreign policy is damaged even further. For no account of explanations, changes, retractions, etc. can wipe away the basic premises and implications presented here. No amount of convoluted rhetoric from the State Department can wipe away the incredible illogic of its premises.
As long as we have people like Sonnenfeldt who compromise the fundamental principles of self-determination and the yearning for human freedom, who pursue an immoral and illogical foreign policy, so long will the American people and the Eastern Europeans — not to mention the rest of the world -- remain confused about the basic objectives of the United States, its foreign policy, and the very foundation of American democracy.
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Endnote: Come to think of it, there is a lot in that last paragraph I wrote 31 years ago that can be applied to today!
Let’s end this treatise with the author of “Gulag,” Anne Applebaum, exerpted from her Slate internet publication, dated February 20, 2007. She titled it “Why do U.S. presidents go weak-kneed for their Russian counterparts?”
She wrote:
/…/ ..we are surprised by Putin, just as we were surprised by Boris Yeltsin before him and indeed Mikhail Gorbachev before that. President George W. Bush treated President Putin the same way all American presidents treat all Russian leaders: as America's new best friend. Not so many years earlier, when President Yeltsin was up for re-election, President Bill Clinton told his main Soviet adviser, Strobe Talbott, "I want this guy to win so bad it hurts." The American president went out of his way to visit Moscow during the campaign, just to make sure Yeltsin won. /…/
/…/ It is, if you think about it, an odd phenomenon. After all, American presidents generally don't campaign on behalf of their French counterparts or look deep into the eyes of German chancellors in order to divine their true nature. Neither Clinton nor Bush appears to have felt a mystical connection to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. /…/
/…/ Yet Russian politicians still seem to make American politicians grow starry-eyed and lose their bearings. Either way, it's time to kick the habit. However friendly and cooperative, however much a "democrat" [a Russian president] appears to be, I hope we'll avoid the instant professions of eternal friendship. At the very least, we'll avoid being unpleasantly surprised, yet again, if things turn out otherwise. /…/
Fully agree.
VELLO EDERMA
August 2007