The upcoming presidential election places Russia’s growing protest movement in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, pro-democracy forces have no candidate of their own: following the experience of 2008, when anti-Kremlin politicians were prevented from running, most opposition leaders declined to participate in the vote; Grigory Yavlinsky, the only liberal leader who did decide to run, has been barred from the ballot. On the other hand, the March vote presents the biggest electoral threat to Vladimir Putin in 12 years. All three of Russia’s national polling agencies—the government-owned VTsIOM, the government-friendly FOM, and the independent Levada Center—suggest that Putin will fall below the 50-percent-plus-one threshold required for a first round victory: they predict, respectively, that he would win 49 percent, 44 percent, and 43 percent of votes cast. And with a possibility of a unified anti-Putin protest vote, the outcome of the runoff is far from certain.
Faced with a seemingly impossible task—winning without a candidate—the Kremlin’s opponents decided to change the stakes. The protest leaders announced that they are prepared to give their backing to any of Putin’s handpicked opponents, as long as the candidate publicly agrees to a set of conditions—a “social contract” with the nation. The conditions, set in writing, include freeing political prisoners; liberalizing election laws and rules on party registration; dissolving the current Duma and holding new, competitive parliamentary elections; and limiting the president’s tenure to a maximum of two, four-year terms during his or her lifetime. The final and most important condition for the would-be president is to serve only for a “transitional period” needed to implement the reforms—12 to 18 months—and then resign and call new elections.
The candidate who came closest to accepting the “social contract” is Sergei Mironov, the former speaker of the upper house, until recently a close associate of Putin’s who has intensified anti-Kremlin rhetoric following his dismissal last year. Mironov has agreed to serve as a “transitional president” until December 2013, with a new presidential vote in March 2014. His plans include holding early parliamentary elections at the end of this year, with prior changes to the “unfair electoral legislation.” His manifesto calls, among other reforms, for a two-term limit on the presidency, easier rules for establishing political parties, and parliamentary (not presidential) appointment of the prime minister. Mironov’s own government would include Yavlinsky as minister for economic development, and anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny as head of the Audit Chamber—though also, bizarrely, nationalist firebrand Dmitri Rogozin (currently Putin’s deputy premier) as foreign minister, and Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov—who has been accused of war crimes in Chechnya—as minister of defense.
(From Vladimir Kara-Murza's blog, February 1, 2012)