Andres Kasekamp
Reviewed by Ain Söödor
In his book, THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA, Andres Kasekamp claims that in 1918, Estonians fought for Estonia because their leaders promised them land and employment. (Page 4).
That is true, but a more accurate description of what actually happened would have made it clear that Communists, who were also trying to recruit Estonians to their internationalist cause, also promised them land and improved living conditions. Estonians rejected their offers - not because they knew that the promises would turn out to be hollow, but because they ultimately believed in what Abraham Lincoln referred to as 'government of the people, by the people' - the fundamental idea that justice and freedom from oppression can best be attained in a state that is not governed by outsiders.
The question remains, did Päts and Laidoner, who were 'insiders' to begin with, gradually become 'outsiders', corrupted by their power and privileges, and did Estonia become a 'police state’ after the crackdown on the Veterans' League in 1935?
The answer to these questions depends, of course, on how 'police states' are defined.
For most people, 'true police states are states like Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany, where elaborate surveillance networks are designed to detect and to suppress all opposition to the policies of the government and to protect the rulers against assassinations, insurrections, conspiracies and all other threats to their power. In essence, the citizens of police states live in fear of the not-so-secret police - there is a constant threat of being arrested, interrogated, beaten, tortured, imprisoned, deported and executed - with or without cause, with or without trial.
There is no evidence to suggest that the vast majority of Estonians, who lived in Estonia after the outlawing of the Veterans' League in 1934, considered Estonia to be a 'police state', especially when compared to what Estonia became after 1939 - after Estonia was occupied first by Stalin's Russia, then by Hitler's Germany and then, once again, by Russia under Stalin and his successors.
This fact, however, does not prevent anyone from claiming that Estonia was, nevertheless, a 'police state' because as long as the 'state of emergency' existed in Estonia, many of the democratic rights and freedoms of Estonians were, undoubtedly, suspended.
In fact, President Päts was accused of having created a police state by four former heads of government - Jaan Tõnisson, Johan Kukk, Jaan Teemant and Ants Piip - who approached President Päts on October 30, 1936, and demanded the easing of the martial law prior to the National Assembly [Riigikogu] elections in December, 1936. According to Kasekamp, 'Päts ignored the memorandum.' (Page 126).
As usual, Kasekamp is not entirely correct.
In an article that originally appeared in “Vaba Eestlane” in June of 1953, and that was reprinted on pages 32-36 in an anthology titled VABA EESTI TÄHISTEL, Rein Marandi - whose work Kasekamp considers to be '...judicious, dispassionate and meticulous' - reports that Päts did, in fact, respond to the former heads of government.
First, the electoral laws were changed to ease the restrictions on the nomination of candidates. Second, Päts said, "I ask these gentlemen, can they guarantee that there will not be a repeat of December 8, (1935), in Estonia?" ("Küsin neilt härradelt, kas nad vôivad tagada, et Eestis ei kordu 8. detsember?"
Of course they could not.
Those who are willing to give Päts the benefit of the doubt, those who are willing to consider the possiblity that Päts was genuinely afraid to ease the martial law - less than one year after the failed attempt to overthrow his government by force - may still go on to conclude that while his fears may have been real, they were, nevertheless, unjustified.
Hindsight certainly tells us so. The trouble with hindsight, of course, is that it often fails to take into account all the circumstances, especially the extreme emotions, during which decisions are made in times of crisis.
As Kasekamp correctly points out on page 150, for Päts, Laidoner and other men of his generation, '... the formative experience of their lives had been the Revolution of 1905." Revolution, for these men, was not a word they read about in history books or newspapers, it was a reality. It was, to them, in essence, a successful defiance of extremely heavy odds, odds that they, themselves, had overcome when they created Estonia.
It follows, therefore, that since Päts had first-hand knowledge of how successful underground activity can be, he was somewhat justified in being afraid of the possibility of another coup d'état - if not by the Veterans then perhaps by Communists, whose 1924 coup d'état had failed but who now, in 1936, according to Päts, were attempting to create labour unrest and who were behind a rise in the number of strikes in Estonia (124).
An important distiction has to be made at this point.
All of the foregoing has suggested that the available evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that the actions of the Päts government - the outlawing of the Veterans League in 1934, the crackdown on the League in 1935, and his refusal to terminate the state of emergency in 1936 - were premeditated, undemocratic and authoritarian, as Kasekamp insists. There is room for doubt, perhaps even reasonable doubt.
From 1937 onward, however, any attempt to convince the critics of the Päts regime that President Päts was justified in extending the severe restricions on civil rights - now that the constitutional reforms were in place and all 'enemies of the state', communists and veterans, had been freed - is likely to fail.
An 'apologist for the Päts regime' may try to argue that a rigorous adherence to narrow, fundamental democratic principles - free elections, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly - does not guarantee justice for all, that there are times when the actions of democratically elected governments can be much more repressive and unjust than the actions of dictators and other rulers with extraordinary powers, that because President Päts was an extraordinarily able leader and he was, therefore, justified in extending the period of 'transition' during which he was free to create a 'legacy' for future generations of Estonians - a truly democratic constitution. The fact that the majority of Estonians trusted him to do just that, did not necessarily make him untrustworthy, authoritarian, fascist or dictatorial.
It is also true, however, that while Estonians may have been right to trust President Päts, while concentrating on doing the best possible job in their various fields, the involvement of Estonians with politics was not as great as it might have been. In the words of the great Estonian writer, Anton Hansen Tammsaare, whom Kasekamp quotes on page 155, Estonians had 'limited experience with participatory democracy' and Estonia had 'an underdeveloped civic culture'.
Estonians may have been right to leave politics to the politicians and wars to the generals and if history and World War Two had not intervened, Estonia may have become a true participatory democracy, governed by laws that restrict and limit the powers of rulers.
But even if this had happened, all is not well that ends well. The reason highly developed democracies do not trust their leaders is that most leaders are much more trustworthy when they are carefully, consistently and frequently monitored - by responsible members of opposition parties, by auditors, by journalists and, above all, by well-informed voters.
(The End)
THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA (10)
Archived Articles | 08 Oct 2002 | EWR
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