Andres Kasekamp

Reviewed by Ain Söödor

In his book, THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA, Andres Kasekamp attempts to argue that the influence of German Nazis on the Veterans '... has been greatly exaggerated', (Page 69), that the League '... did not aspire to erect an one-party authoritarian state, much less a totalitarian one', (Page 66), and that the Veterans believed in 'democratic rules' (Page 156). Out of context, these claims may have some credibility for the casual reader. In context, the reality is that these statements are largely based on the unsubstantiated claims and denials made by people such as Hjalmar Mäe, the League's propaganda strategist, and by the Veterans' newspaper, VÕITLUS. The reality is that when the leaders of the Veterans spoke of a 'democracy without parties' (Page 66), their statements demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of 'democratic rules'.

The reality is also, that in 1935, the leaders of the Veterans' League planned to place all members of the democratically elected government of President Päts under arrest and to overthrow the Estonian Government by force of arms. Kasekamp admits that if the ill-conceived and aborted coup had been carried out '... it would probably have involved casualties,' but he then goes on to argue that '... it is important to note that the plan was conceived with the aim of avoiding bloodshed.' (Page 159).

Kasekamp may not realize it but what he is actually saying is that because the plotters '...optimistically hoped to avoid bloodshed by presuming no resistance', (Page 113), they were acting in accordance with 'democratic rules'.

Kasekamp shows himself to be a true academic when he attempts to determine if the Veterans' League was a 'genuine fascist movement' by applying the criteria of 'fascism' proposed by Stanley Payne and Geoff Eley to the Veterans. (Page 159).

'While fascism remains a problematic concept and a matter of dispute among scholars,' Kasekamp writes, '... probably the most convincing and widely accepted definition of fascism is Stanley Payne's typological description.'

Kasekamp then quotes Payne, the author of A HISTORY OF FASCISM, who defines fascists as those who are against some things such as communism and in favor or other things such as a nationalist authoritarian state, territorial expansion, a corporatist economic structure, emotive political rituals, the exaltation of youth and authoritarian leadership.

The trouble with Payne's criteria is that they do not apply exclusively to fascists. Communists believe in a nationalist authoritarian state, territorial expansion, emotive political rituals, the exaltation of youth. Viewed from the Marxist perspective, all non-Communist states, are either 'nationalist', 'authoritarian' or both. Kasekamp then quotes Geoff Eley, author of CONSERVATIVES AND RADICAL NATIONALISTS IN GERMANY, who claims that '... the use of violence ultimately distinguishes fascism from the radical right.' Because political campaigning in Estonia involved only 'skirmishes' between the Veterans and Socialists, and because '... physical conflict never went beyond fisticuffs, and violence never got out of control, nor did it result in any fatalities...' (pages 158-159), Kasekamp concludes that the Veterans, therefore, belonged to the 'radical right' but they were not '... a genuine fascist movement.' (Page 159)

According to this kind of logic, since Hitler's seizure of power, after he became Chancellor, did not involve bloodshed or the use of violence, Hitler was not a genuine fascist.

The casual reader may be persuaded by Kasekamp's attempt to 're-label' the Veterans but Kasekamp, himself, does not seem to be entirely convinced by his own arguments.

He says, (on page 158), that '... although the Veterans were inclined towards the ideological goals of fascism, they did not fully embrace any of them'. He also says, (on page 106), that '... the unanswered question remains whether the Veterans, if elected to power, would have continued to play by the democratic rules, or maintained [or increased] their power by other means.' (Page 106).

Leaving aside the question of whether, in Kasekamp's mind, 'continuing' to play 'by democratic rules' is the same thing as 'playing with democratic rules', it is true that we will never know how far the Veterans would have gone if they had been elected to power - or if their 1935 coup d'état had succeeded.

Because they did not succeed, we will never know how 'fully' the Veterans would have embraced the ideological goals of fascism and to what extent they would have followed in the footsteps of Hitler who, like Lenin and Stalin, demonstrated, again and again and over and over, that what matters is not what the leaders of any political movement will say, what matters is what they do.

All this is not to suggest that scholars and academics should abandon their attempts to arrive at a satisfactory definition of fascism. Fascism is, undoubtedly, an extremely interesting ideology, but it can not be defined merely by its articulated aims.

At the core of fascism is mysticism - it is a deliberately vague, conspiratorial and devious ideology, full of hints and suggestions about 'final solutions' to various 'problems' that are never fully expressed in words and that can only be understood in retrospect.

Hitler claimed that 'Only those who understand Wagner can understand the Nazi Party' and it is not inconceivable that Hitler admired not only Wagner's operas but also Wagner, the man, who was widely known to be liar, a cheat, and a hypocrite, without the slightest regard for ethics, morality or personal honor.

(To be continued)

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