THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA - Part 6
Arvamus | 10 Sep 2002  | EWR
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Andres Kasekamp

Reviewed by Ain Söödor

Some of the historians, writers, and observers, who have argued that Estonia, during its final years of independence, was a fascist country, have deliberately and knowingly distorted the truth in order to justify the illegal occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union and the continuing presence of Russians in Estonia.

Others, perhaps in search of the truth but not always capable of grasping the whole truth, have ended up presenting facts, figures and opinions about Estonia in ways that distort, diminish, discredit and ultimately dismiss the very real accomplishments of Estonians who, in a very short period of time, succeeded in making Estonia into a civilized, cultured, liberal, just and democratic society.

As far as Kasekamp's case against President Päts is concerned, it is, at first sight, both formidable and substantial, although, upon closer examination, much of it turns out to be conjecture, based on circumstantial evidence.

One of the things that weakens Kasekamp's case is that he presumes to know what was going on in the mind of President Päts. Päts was ,'convinced', Kasekamp says, that he was the man who was 'made to measure' for the presidential office. 'As things stood at the beginning of March 1934’ he writes, 'Päts looked to be heading for certain defeat and that would have been unbearable for a man who thought only he knew what was best for the Estonian nation. Having worked longest to create a presidency, Päts was not going to allow some upstarts to steal the position that he felt he had justifiably earned. Moreover, he had a tendency to identify the fate of the nation with his own political fate.' (Page 104).

How does Kasekamp know these things? How does he know what Päts was 'convinced' of and what would have been 'unbearable' for him? How does he know that Päts identified his own fate with the fate of the nation?

Kasekamp claims that the Veterans neither wanted or needed to seize power by force because their party was '... expected to triumph in the elections' (Page 101), but, according to his own analysis, victory for the 'upstarts' was, in fact, far from certain.

'It would be wrong,' writes Kasekamp on Page 62, 'to conclude from the figures, [Larka - 64,658, Laidoner - 38,493, Päts - 18,577, and Rei - 5,071], that Larka would certainly have won the election.' According to the results of the only elections that the League ever contested, (the elctions for municipal rural district councils, held in January 1934), '... support for the League was much greater in the larger cities than in the countryside.' Because the signatures had to be collected in three weeks, '...it was much easier to collect them in the cities than in rural areas, (where the majority of the population lived)'. As a result, says Kasekamp, the figures obtained during the gathering of the signatures '... provided a skewed picture of the likely results of the election' (Pages 62-63)

Kasekamp then goes on to point out that because an absolute majority was required in the first round of the presidential elections, '... in the second round, the most plausible outcome would have been a united front against the Veterans, resulting in the victory of Laidoner over Larka with support from backers of both Päts and Rei.' (Pages 62 and 63). This argument, incidentally, is based on the assumption that in the first round of the presidential elections, Laidoner would have gotten more votes than Päts. Again, that was far from certain.

The signatures garnered by Laidoner may also have provided a 'skewed picture' of the likely results of the election because they also came mostly from the cities and Päts was much more popular than Laidoner in the rural areas, where the majority of the population lived.

It is also important to keep in mind the fact that Laidoner's reputation had been seriously damaged during the pre-election, signature-gathering campaign, when Hjalmar Mäe, in the Veterans' newspaper, VÕITLUS, obtained and published confidential and, apparently accurate records and documents of Laidoner's unsuccessful business dealings - his pursuit of personal profits and how '... the Bank of Estonia had cancelled some of his debts.' (Kasekamp, Page 59.)

If victory for the 'upstarts' was 'unlikely', then why did Päts outlaw the Veteran's League, why did Päts declare a state of emergency on March 12, 1934, why did Päts appoint Laidoner Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Chief of Internal Security, why did Päts charge that the Veterans had been 'preparing a revolution', that they were ready to take over power, by force, if necessary, and why did Päts say that he was forced into action by 'news from Laidoner' that a seizure of power was imminent?

Kasekamp's answer is that Päts knew 'perfectly well' that there was no imminent seizure of power, but he invented a crisis that would allow him to cancel the presidential elections and to assume dictatorial powers.

Kasekamp then, somewhat characteristically, proceeds to undermine his own credibility.

He points out, on page 100, that the cadets of the military academy, under Colonel Alexander Jaakson, were given the task of suppressing the uprising because other military units stationed in Tallinn were '...not considered to be politically reliable'. On the next page Kasekamp says, 'the manner of troop deployment' on March 12 '... attests to the fact that the government knew perfectly well that the Veterans were not going to seize power. The Tallinn garrison was not used, nor were troops deployed at key communications sites that would have been the targets of any coup attempt.'

In other words, Kasekamp says that not all the available troops in Tallinn were used because some of them were considered to be 'politically unreliable'. He then says that the fact that 'politically unreliable' troops were not used, proves that the government knew 'perfectly well' that the Veterans had no plans for a coup d'état.

If anything, avoiding the deployment of politically unreliable troops, 'proves' that there may well have been a conspiracy.

(To be continued)

 
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