Andres Kasekamp
Reviewed by Ain Söödor
Andres Kasekamp, the author of THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA, does not believe that the Veterans' League was planning a 'coup d'état' in 1934.
If that is true, then why - after discovering that a crack down on the League was imminent, (as Hjalmar Mäe reports in his autobiography, 'KUIDAS KõIK TEOSTUS', 'How it all happened') - why did the leaders of the League destroy all their records and documents - records and documents, that would have 'proven' their 'innocence' - if, indeed, they were innocent.
Also, if there were no plans to seize power, then why, after the Veterans' constitutional amendment for a strong presidency was overwhelmingly approved in October 1933, did some Veterans' interpret that to mean that, having secured a 'mandate' from the people, the League should not wait for presidential elections but, instead, '... take over power immediately' and put an end to '... the profiteering and vested interests in the existing party political system', as Kasekamp reports on page 49?
And if there were no plans to seize power, then why did the Veterans' leaders - and it is perhaps important to emphasize, once again, that the leaders did not speak for all the members of the League - why did the leaders argue that the Veterans cannot '...allow the political parties to seize power under the new constitution' (Page 51), why did they say that, 'We would make a fateful and unalterable mistake if we entrusted the leadership of the new second republic to the old party system,' and why did they speak of the need to replace the existing 'false democracy' with a 'true democracy', with a leader who would rule with a 'firm hand'? (Page 66)
The above statements suggest, among other things, that in the opinion of some of the leaders of the League, if a democratically elected government outlaws a political party that is planning a 'coup d'état', then the government is attempting to 'seize power' and that the government's action should be described as a 'government coup d'état'.
This, as it turns out, is exactly what Kasekamp believes.
Kasekamp believes that the government's outlawing of the League was a 'government coup d'état' and whenever he talks about the crack-down on the League, Kasekamp consistently and repeatedly describes the government's actions by calling it 'Päts' coup d'état'. (See pages 1, 86, 96, 98, 104, 106, 122, 131). Kasekamp tries to justify his departure from common usage by claiming that 'The appointment of a Supreme Commander during peacetime and the postponement of elections were both contrary to the new constitution. Thus Päts' and Laidoner's actions cannot be termed anything but a coup d'état.' (Page 104).
Cannot? Of course they can.
By Kasekamp's own admission, there are historians who can and do refer to Päts' and Laidoner's actions as a '...pre-emptive coup against the threat of a fascist takeover', (Page 2), thereby using a phrase that is much more in accordance with the Oxford dictionary's definition of 'coup d'état' as a 'violent or illegal change of government', with emphasis on the words 'violent'. Kasekamp may argue at this point that the emphasis should be on the word 'illegal', because, as we have seen, the new so-called 'Veterans' Constitution' did make it illegal for the president to declare a state of emergency except '... in response to a threat of war...' (Page 45).
But while the authors of the so-called Veterans' Constitution had seen to it that it was illegal for the president to declare a state of emergency in response to an 'internal' threat - possibly because they had in mind a future plan involving a possible takeover of the government by force - common sense suggests that any democratically elected government is justified in putting down an armed insurrection, even when the government's allowable responses to a crisis are not clearly spelled out in the country's constitution.
When, during the so-called 'October Crisis', Canada's Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, fearing an armed rebellion by French Canadian separatists in the Province of Québec, invoked the 'War Measures Act', it did not occur to anyone to describe his actions as 'an illegal 'government coup d'état', just because no 'Separatist Threat Act' was in existence.
During the 'October Crisis' I was working in Toronto as one of the producers of the CBC Current Affairs Network TV program, WEEKEND. We were constantly in touch with all available sources of information in Ottawa, in Montreal and the rest of Quebec, but when the separatists demanded that their 'manifesto' should be read out on the air, no one really knew if we were up against a handful of hoodlums or a well-armed, sizeable group of fanatics. What we knew - and what Trudeau knew - if there is a threat of armed insurrection and the government in power wants to suppress it, the action must be decisive and swift.
We know now that the threat of an armed rebellion in Quebec was not as great as it was originally thought to be, we also know that the Government's 'intelligence' was flawed and Trudeau's actions - sending armed troops to Quebec and arresting and detaining a number of people who were suspected of being a part of a separatist coup - have been criticized as excessive in the absence of hard evidence.
And while most of the 886 Estonians who were arrested on March 12, 1934 - and most of whom were released a few days or weeks later - may well have been what they said they were, innocent of all wrongdoing, we also know that in times of crisis, it is better to be safe than sorry and underreacting is worse than overreacting. (To be continued)
THE RADICAL RIGHT IN INTERWAR ESTONIA - Part 7
Archived Articles | 17 Sep 2002 | EWR
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