It was noticably heightened about two months after the government moved the statue of the Soviet soldier to a military cemetery in the spring of 2007, triggering protests from some local Russians and Moscow. During the early summer of 2007, the issuance of visas for travel between Russia and the European Union was simplified and Estonian authorities noticed a sharp increase in Russian clandestine services personnel attending ethnic Russian functions in Estonia. In fact immediately on the first day of the new visa regime, a high ranking operative of the First Chief Directorate of the Russian SVR came to Estonia to meet fellow compatriots. Thereafter many followed.
Some four months before the relocation of the statue, the SVR began to formulate plans on how to react if the `bronze soldier` is moved. They were directly involved in the highly emotional anti-Estonian media campaign in Russia and in efforts to neutralize those Russian politicians who saw the relocation as a normal non-hostile event. Their assignment also included becoming involved in Estonian-based Russian organizations to co-opt them for Moscow`s interests in the future. In addition SVR officers under diplomatic cover are tasked with cultivating and developing organizations and individuals that can be used as sources of influence in Estonia.
In addition, the SVR, already in 2007, was eyeing the current 2011 elections. Convinced that the `bronze soldier` affair would help to coalesce Russian anti-government and anti-Estonian feelings amongst the ethnic Russian population in Estonia, the SVR thought the time was ripe to support the establishment of a viable political force which could place Russian MPs into the Estonian parliament. (This assessment would seem to be at cross purposes with what has been often observed: prominent Russian politicians urging the Russian electorate in Estonia to vote strategically, not to waste their votes on Russian candidates representing Russian parties, but rather to vote for Edgar Savisaar`s Centre Party so as to not have their votes go to waste.)
The Estonian security police has also seen a heightened interest from foreign intelligence agencies towards Estonian technological developments, especially in the energy sector. It has cautioned the government about the possibility of foreign capital investing in strategically important industries in the energy, transportation, harbours etc. The security police has also shown concern in foreign financial participation in government owned enterprises.
Just recently Tarmo Türkson, who for 10 years directed Estonia`s foreign intelligence capability and is now the deputy minister of the interior, warned that foreign spies have a greater interest in Estonian citizens abroad than one may expect. Those with access to special information are attractive targets, especially those who have received official Estonian security clearances. Türkson says that 90% of the risks associated with foreign intelligence can easily be avoided – just live a normal, law-abiding life. The other 10% of the dangers of getting compromised are spelled out at government training sessions and workshops.

Türkson added that people who feel that they have become of interest to foreign operatives should contact the security police (Kapo) or the foreign intelligence service. The security police are responsible for counter-intelligence domestically and the foreign intelligence service for the same abroad.
One doesn`t need to consider Russian secret service personnel as a lurking presence that wants to and is able to influence any person or group at will. That`s a paranoid obsession far from reality. But Türkson stressed that anyone foolish enough to be co-opted by the SVR or FSB, must face the consequences of long, lonely years of imprisonment. Russians remorselessly discard foreign recruits and leave them to their fate. They have no intention of using a “spy for a spy” exchange possibility to repatriate the dupe. Remember Herman Simm?

Märkmed: